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This  paper  considers  an  economy  where  a  public  good  is  provided  via  advertising.  The 
consumers’  preferences  are  represented  using  the  ‘characteristics’  approach’,  and  the  advertising 
has  a  potentially  enhancing  effect  on  the  characteristics’  content  of  a  given  commodity.  We 
define  competitive  equilibria  and  show  they  exist.  The  welfare  properties  of  the  resulting 
allocations  are  analyzed,  and  conditions  for  over-  and  under-production  of  the  public  good  are 
provided. 
1.  Introduction 
The  phenomenon  of  public  goods  has  been  extensively  discussed  in  the 
economics  literature.  It  is  well  known  that  in  the  presence  of  public  goods 
the  free  market  system  fails  to  allocate  resources  efficiently. 
For  economies  with  public  goods,  one  can  define  the  notion  of  a  Lindahl 
equilibrium.  It  can  be  demonstrated,  under  reasonable  assumptions,  that  this 
equilibrium  exists.  Furthermore,  it  can  be  shown  that  any  Lindahl  equili- 
brium  is  Pareto  optimal,  and  any  Pareto-optimal  allocation  can  be  sup- 
ported  as  a  Lindahl  equilibrium,  following  an  appropriate  redistribution  of 
endowments. 
Lindahl  equilibria,  however,  suffer  from  several  practical  problems  (the 
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foremost  being  the  need  for  a  large  number  of  very  thin  markets).  They  are 
rarely  encountered  in  practice,  despite  their  appealing  normative  properties. 
Several  alternative  methods  have  been  suggested  to  decide  upon  the  amounts 
of  public  goods  provided,  as  well  as  the  appropriate  financing  methods. 
This  paper  is  concerned  with  one  of  these  alternative  methods.  We  look  at 
a  very  common  public  good,  TV  broadcasting,’  which  is  financed  to  a  large 
extent  by  advertising  revenues.  We  address  the  question  of  whether  or  not 
firms,  wishing  to  advertise  their  products  by  financing  TV  broadcasts, 
provide  the  public  with  an  optimal  quantity  of  the  public  good. 
The  producers  hope  that  by  advertising  they  will  be  able  to  raise  their 
prices.  The  consumers  enjoy  the  public  good  (TV  broadcasts)  and  might  end 
up  paying  higher  prices  for  the  advertised  goods.  Questions  regarding  the 
optimality  properties  of  this  set-up  were  raised  in  the  economics  literature 
several  years  ago  in  a  series  of  papers  [Minasian  (1964),  Coase  (1966)  and 
Levin  (1970)].  These  papers  did  not  provide  adequate  answers,  mainly 
because  the  theory  and  models  of  advertising  and  its  effect  on  consumers 
were  not  sufficiently  developed. 
We  model  the  economy  following  Stigler  and  Becker  (1977).  They  assumed 
that  consumers’  utility  functions  are  defined  over  characteristics  rather  than 
commodities.  The  consumers  use  the  commodities  as  inputs  in  the  ‘produc- 
tion’  of  characteristics.  The  transformation  process  from  commodities  to 
characteristics  depends  on  the  information  available  to  the  consumer.  The 
main  role  of  advertising  is  to  provide  consumers  with  more  information,  thus 
making  it  possible  for  them  to  ‘produce’  more  characteristics  from  a  given 
amount  of  commodities  (inputs).  The  advertiser,  on  the  other  hand,  expects 
this  will  lead  the  consumer  to  pay  a  higher  price  for  the  commodity  being 
advertised. 
A  concrete  example  of  the  kind  of  scenario  we  have  in  mind  is  athletic 
footwear.  The  footwear  is  the  good,  whereas  the  derived  characteristic  is  the 
time  period  at  which  it  can  be  worn.  Advertising  shows  the  consumers  that 
these  athletic  shoes  can  be  worn  for  activities  other  than  sports,  thus 
increasing  the  ‘characteristic  content’  of  a  given  pair  of  shoes.  This  will 
induce  more  purchases  and/or  higher  prices. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  2  we  describe  the  basic 
economy.  It  is  shown  that  a  competitive  equilibrium  exists  and  would 
generally  lead  to  a  non-optimal  allocation  of  resources.  The  conditions  under 
which  over-  (under-)  provision  of  the  public  good  would  occur  are  carefully 
stated  and  discussed  (some  numerical  examples  are  described  in  the  appen- 
dix).  In  the  final  section,  we  show  that  our  analytical  and  qualitative  results 
‘TV  broadcasts  are  certainly  non-rivalous  in  consumption.  The  need  for  decoders  and 
receivers  provides  for  the  possibility  of  excludability.  However,  we  consider  economies  where  no 
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are  robust  with  regard  to  alternative  specifications  of  the  underlying 
economy  and  offer  further  lines  of  research. 
2.  The  basic  economy 
The  economy  consists  of  two  identical  consumers,’  two  characteristics 
(zi,z,),  three  private  commodities  (x1,x2,  t),  a  public  good  (y),  capital  (k), 
and  one  firm  which  produces  both  xi  and  y.  We  assume  there  is  no 
production  of  x2. 
Consumer  i  has  initial  endowments  x:i,  xi*,,  t*,  and  kT  of  commodities, 
time,  and  capital. 
The  utility  function  of  consumer  i is  assumed  to  be  of  the  form 
u,(t,y,  t* -  ti, zil,  ziz),  i = 1,2. 
The  tiy  argument  represents  the  amount  of  the  public  good  entering  the 
utility  function.  As  the  quality  of  the  broadcast  increases  (a  larger  y)  the 
marginal  utility  of  watching  TV  (tJ  increases.  This  might  lead  to  a  larger  ti. 
Time  not  spent  watching  TV  is  used  up  in  other  leisure  activities  and 
appears  as  the  second  argument  in  the  utility  function.  The  two  characteris- 
tics  constitute  the  remaining  arguments  of  the  utility  function. 
The  transition  from  commodities  to  characteristics  is  given  by 
zil  =.fXtiIxil  and  zi2 =xi2,  i=  42. 
Thus,  we  identify  the  second  commodity  with  the  second  characteristic.  As 
regards  the  first  commodity,  the  transformation  into  the  first  characteristic  is 
non-trivial.  It  will  depend  on  the  information  available  to  the  consumer.  The 
information  is  derived  from  TV  advertising.  We  assume  the  transformation 
process  takes  on  the  above-specified  multiplicative  form,  so  that  a  larger  ti 
serves  to  increase  the  characteristics’  content  of  xii.  fi  is  assumed  to  be 
differentiable  and  strictly  increasing. 
Hence,  the  utility  function  in  the  commodities  space  would  be 
ui(tiy,  t*-ti,f,(ti)Xi,,  Xi*),  i=  1,2. 
It  is  assumed  to  be  differentiable,  strictly  increasing  in  its  four  arguments, 
and  strictly  quasi-concave  in  ti,  xii,  and  xi2. 
Even  though  we  have  assumed  consumers  are  identical  and  hence  u1 = u2 
and  fi  = f2,  we  maintain  the  consumer’s  index  on  these  functions  to 
distinguish  between  the  consumers  when  writing  down  the  Pareto-optimality 
conditions. 
‘They  will  have  identical  preferences  as  well  as  identical  initial  endowments  and  share 
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The  firm  produces  xi  and  y  via  the  production  functions  g(k,,)  and  h(k,), 
respectively. 
An  allocation  for  the  economy  would  be  a  non-negative  tuple  of  numbers: 
Xll,Xlz,X21,X22,~l,t2,Y,  kxl,k,. 
Feasibility  is  defined  in  the  obvious  way  and  an  allocation  is  Pareto 
optimal  if  there  exists  no  other  feasible  allocation  where  no  individual  is 
worse  off  and  at  least  one  individual  is  strictly  better  off. 
Any  interior  Pareto-optimal  allocation  would  satisfy  the  following  con- 
dition  (assuming  the  necessary  differentiability  requirements): 
u11t1  u21t2  g’ 
~l,flO  +  Gfzo  =  h” 
(1) 
where  Uij denotes  the  partial  derivative  of  ui  with  respect  to  its  jth  argument. 
It  is  the  usual  optimality  condition  in  economies  with  public  goods:  ‘The 
sum  of  the  individual  Marginal  Rates  of  Substitution  (MRS,)  equals  the  Rate 
of  Technical  Substitution  (RTS).’ 
Note  that  for  a  symmetric  Pareto-optimal  allocation  this  condition  reduces 
to 
241t1  g’ 
43f1(t1)  =h” 
We  prove  that  competitive  equilibria  for  the  economy  described  above 
exist  and  examine  the  properties  satisfied  by  the  resulting  allocations.  To  this 
effect,  we  study  the  problems  that  are  solved  by  the  consumers  and  the 
producer. 
2.1.  The  consumers’  problem 
The  consumers  treat  the  commodity  prices  as  given,  ignoring  the  effect 
that  viewing  time  may  have  on  the  prices  charged.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
take  into  account  the  informational  content  of  the  broadcast  when  choosing 
the  viewing  time.  We  formulate  the  consumers’  problems  as  follows 
max  ui(tiY,  t*  -  ti, f,(ti)xil,  xi2) 
1L..x,I,WZ 
S.t. pl  Xi1 +  p2Xi2  =  Ii,  i=  1,2, 
ti, Xi1  2  Xi2 2 O, 
ti 5  t*. 
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2.2.  The  x1  and y producer’s  problem 
The  producer  behaves  competitively,  by  which  we  mean  the  prices  of  the 
relevant  characteristic  and  the  production  factor  are  treated  as  given. 
In  order  to  formulate  the  producer’s  problem  one  needs  to  specify  the 
producer’s  beliefs  concerning  the  relationship  between  the  public  good  level, 
y,  and  the  viewing  time,  t.  We  assume  the  beliefs  are  given  by  t,(y)  =ay. 
Since  consumers  are  identical,  it  is  not  necessary  to  specify  consumers’ 
specific  beliefs.  We  require  that  in  equilibrium  the  producer’s  beliefs  coincide 
with  the  times  chosen  by  the  consumers.3 
The  producer  will  therefore  solve: 
max  41 f1(4k,))g(k,&  -  w(k,,  + kJ4 
2.3.  The  competitive  equilibrium 
A  competitive  equilibrium  is  a  feasible  allocation  B = 
(XI1,X1Z~~ZI~X 22, tl,  t,,  y, kxl,  k,),  prices  p,  ql,  w, and  ~1,  all  non-negative,  that 
satisfy 
(i)  t,  = t,,5 
(ii)  ay=  t,, 
(iii)  p1 =qIfi(~I)~ 
(iv)  Given  the  prices  pi,  pz,  ql,  w,  and  a,  the  allocation  B  solves  the 
problems  of  the  consumers  and  the  producer  described  above. 
Proposition  I.  Given the assumptions: 
For  i=  1,2 
(i)  ui(tiy, t* -  ti,fi(tJxiI,  XiJ  is  continuous,  increasing,  and  strictly  quasi- 
concave  in ti, xii  and xi2; 
(ii)  f;  is continuous  and  increasing; 
(iii)  xT1, XT*  and  k:  are  strictly positive; 
and 
(iv)  q,fI(ah(k,))g(k,,)-w(k,,  +k,)  is continuous  and  concave  in kzI  and  k, 
for  any non-negative  ql,  CI  and  w; 
3Hence  we  allow  the  beliefs  to  differ  from  the  time  chosen  for  out-of-equilibrium  actions.  This 
is  similar  to  the  treatment  of  beliefs  in  general  equilibrium  models  of  monopolistic  competition 
[Negishi  (196@1961),  Arrow  and  Hahn  (1971)]. 
‘Since  fI  =f2  and  consumers  are  identical,  we  may  use  either  one  in  specifying  the  producer’s 
problem. 
5This  is  because  we  want  the  consumers  to  face  the  same  price  for  x1.  Given  our  assumptions 
regarding  preferences  and  the  fact  the  consumers  are  identical,  it  is  obvious  that  t,  would  indeed 
equal  t,.  We  will  address  the  issue  of  different  prices  and  non-identical  consumers  in  the  final 
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(v)  h  is  increasing,  continuous,  concave  and  h(0) > 0; 
(vi)  g  is  increasing,  continuous  and  concave  with  g(0)  = 0; 
there  exists  a  competitive  equilibrium. 
Proof.  We  adopt  the  abstract  game  approach  [Shafer  and  Sonnenschein 
(1975)  and  Debreu  (1982)]. 
We  first  ‘bound’  the  economy.  The  set  of  all  pairs  (xilrxiZ)  individual  i can 
get  in  a  feasible  allocation  is  bounded;  the  same  holds  for  the  set  of  all 
feasible  (k,,,k,)  choices.  Let  D  be  a  compact  and  convex  set  in  R$  which 
contains  these  sets  in  its  interior. 
There  are  four  players:  the  two  consumers,  the  producer,  and  a  market 
player.  The  game  can  be  described  as  follows.  The  market  player  chooses 
three  prices  (q,,p2,w)  and  ~1, the  producer  chooses  k,,  and  k,,  and  the 
consumers  choose  the  Xij’S  and  tls.  The  payoff  functions  are  the  utility 
functions  of  the  consumers  and  the  profit  function  for  the  producer  (this 
profit  function  will  incorporate  the  beliefs  regarding  the  relationship  between 
t  and  y).  The  market  player’s  payoff  is  the  usual  value  of  excess  demand  and 
an  additional  term  inducing  the  ‘correct’  choice  for  ~1. 
Formally  the  game  is  comprised  of: 
(a)  Strategy  sets.  The  strategy  sets  for  the  consumers  are  Ai= 
[0, t*]x(R:  n D),  i=  1,2.  The  strategy  set  for  the  x1  and  y  producer  is 
A,  = R:  A  D.  The  strategy  set  for  the  market  player  is 
A,=  S3x[0,  t*/h(O)]  (S3  the  unit  simplex  in  R3). 
Let  A = rcf= 1  Ai,  and  let  a denote  a  generic  element  of  A. 
(b)  Feasibility  correspondences:6 
~l(a)=(xEAl(qlfi(ah(ky))(x,,-x:,)+p,(x,,-xx:,)~O.5711+wk:), 
42(a)=(xEAzIqlf~(CLh(ky))(xZ1-xtl)+~2(x22-xaz)~O05711+wkf), 
where 
n,  =41fi(crh(k,))g(k,,)-w(k,,  +&I, 
$i(a)  = Ai,  for  i = 3,4. 
(c)  Payoff  functions: 
~l(a)=u~(tly,t*-t~,fi(tl)x~~~x12), 
PAa)  =u2(t2y,  t* -tz,f2(tz)x21422). 
61n  an  abstract  game  the  strategies  available  to  player  i  may  depend  on  the  strategies  chosen 
by  other  players.  The  ith  feasibility  correspondence  will  map  A  into  Ai,  indicating  the  subset  of 
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~3(~)=41fi(ah(k,))g(k,,)-w(k,,  +k,)> 
bd4=~lfl(tlNx11  -x71 +x,1  -xh  -g(U) 
+w(k,,+k,-k:‘-k:)+p,(x,,-x:,+x,,-x~,) 
+ za _  a2Qk,) 
t1 
The  strategy  sets  are  compact  and  convex.  The  feasibility  correspondences 
are  continuous  and  convex-valued  (the  budget  correspondence  is  well- 
behaved  since  profits  are  non-negative  and  initial  endowments  are  strictly 
positive).  The  payoff  functions  are  all  continuous  and  quasi-concave  in  the 
relevant  choice  variables.  Hence,  the  abstract  game  has  an  equilibrium.  By 
the  market  player’s  payoff  function  we  see  that  in  equilibrium  a=  t,/h(k,). 
Since  the  consumers  are  identical  and  face  identical  convex  choice  sets  with 
strictly  quasi-concave  payoff  functions,  t,  = t,  in  equilibrium,  demonstrating 
that  in  equilibrium  LYY  equals  the  times  chosen  by  the  consumers.  Given  the 
specification  of  the  payoff  functions  it  is  obvious  that  the  equilibrium  actions 
for  the  game  solve  the  consumers’  and  producer’s  problems  in  the  bounded 
economy.  Adding  up  the  budget  constraints  [recalling  that  in  equilibrium 
cth(k,)  = t,  = t,],  we  derive  that  in  the  equilibrium  for  the  game: 
+w(k,,+k,-k:-k;)=O. 
Hence,  the  value  of  excess  demand  is  non-positive  for  any  choice  of  qi,  p2 
and  w.  This  implies  that  the  excess  demand  in  each  market  is  non-positive, 
which  when  combined  with  the  fact  that  the  value  of  excess  demand  in 
equilibrium  is  zero  and  pl,  p2  and  w  are  all  positive  (recall  that  preferences 
as  well  as  production  functions  are  assumed  to  be  strictly  monotone)  shows 
that  all  the  markets  clear. 
It  can  be  shown  in  the  usual  manner  that  the  consumers’  and  producer’s 
actions  would  solve  their  respective  problems  even  in  the  non-bounded 
economy  and  thus  we  have  demonstrated  the  existence  of  a  competitive 
equilibrium.  Q.E.D. 
We  now  show  that,  in  general,  the  market  allocation  would  lead  to  a 
non-optimal  level  of  the  public  good.  The  nature  of  the  deviation  (i.e. 
whether  there  is  too  little  y  or  too  much  y)  will  depend  upon  the  preferences 
of  the  individuals  and  the  effectiveness  of  advertising.  The  larger  the  marginal 
utility  of  the  public  good  relative  to  the  marginal  utility  of  the  produced 
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the  public  good  and  vice  versa.  The  more  effective  the  advertising  is  (a  larger 
f;)  the  more  likely  we  are  to  encounter  overprovision  of  the  public  good 
and  vice  versa.  The  precise  conditions  for  the  economy  with  identical 
individuals  are  given  in  Proposition  2.  Note  that  since  the  individuals  are 
treated  symmetrically  in  the  market  allocations,  we  use  individual  one’s 
utility  function  to  describe  the  conditions. 
From  the  producer’s  problem  we  see  that  the  producer’s  optimal  (interior) 
choices  must  satisfy 
The  marginal  productivity  of  k  is  equated  over  its  alternative  uses. 
Proposition  2.  If the  market  allocation  satisfies  ~~,y*#u,,f~x~~,  then  it  is 
not  Pareto  optimal.  Furthermore,  if  u,,y*>(  <)u,,f;x:,,  then  there  is  too 
little  (much)  y  produced  [i.e.  individuals  could  be  better  off  by  allocating  more 
(less)  of  K  to  the  production  of  y]. 
Proof.  Eq.  (2),  which  is  satisfied  by  the  market  allocation,  can  be  written  as 
&C= mf ;g(k:I) 
h’  fi(ah(k:))’ 
Note  that  g(k.z,)  =2x:,  , h(k,*) = y*  and  in  equilibrium  my* = t:;  thus, 
g’  2f;x:ltrf 
F  =  ___----~  Y*fI(t:) 
Any  Pareto-optimal  allocation  must  satisfy  (1).  Since  the  competitive 
equilibrium  allocation  treats  the  two  identical  individuals  symmetrically,  (1) 
reduces  to 
g’  2u11t: 
F = U13fi(t:)’ 
Thus,  if  f~x~l/y*#u,,/u13  or,  in  other  words,  u,,y*#u,3f~x~1,  the 
market  allocation  would  not  be  Pareto  optimal. 
Furthermore,  note  that  if  ~~~y*>u~~f~x~~,  then  f~~~~/y*<u,,/u,,,  and 
the  market  allocation  satisfies  g’/h’<2u,,t’f/u,,f,(t:)  so  that  the  sum  of  the 
MRSs  exceeds  the  MRT,  and  individuals  can  be  better  off  by  producing 
more  y.  Increasing  production  of  y  is  beneficial  because  consumers  at  the 
margin  value  this  more  (through  increasing  the  utility  from  the  consumption 
of  the  public  good)  than  the  loss  of  utility  incurred  by  having  to  reduce  the 
output  of  the  other  good.  However,  increasing  the  production  of  y  would 
reduce  the  firm’s  profits,  since  it  has  to  bear  all  the  cost  of  advertising  (i.e. I.  Luski  and  D.  Wettstein,  The  provision  of public goods  via advertising  317 
the  provision  cost  of  the  public  good),  and  the  resulting  increase  in  revenues 
would  not  justify  it.  Thus  the  market  mechanism  would  end  up  providing  a 
sub-optimal  amount  of  the  public  good. 
A  similar  argument  demonstrates  there  is  too  much  y  if  the  inequality  is 
reversed.  Q.E.D. 
3.  Summary  and  conclusions 
We  have  studied  an  economy  where  a  public  good  (TV  broadcasting)  is 
provided  as  a  by-product  of  advertising  by  producers  of  private  commodities. 
The  consumers’  preferences  were  defined  over  characteristics  and  the 
advertising  activity  influenced  the  transformation  from  commodities  to 
characteristics. 
We  modelled  the  economy  so  as  to  capture  the  basic  ingredients  of 
preferences,  production,  and  advertising.  A  competitive  equilibrium  taking 
into  account  the  producer’s  beliefs  regarding  consumers’  behaviour  was 
defined  and  shown  to  exist.  It  was  demonstrated  that,  in  general,  the 
resulting  market  allocation  would  be  non-optimal. 
The  analytical  as  well  as  the  qualitative  conclusions  we  have  reached  in 
our  basic  economy  extend  to  more  complex  environments.  If  we  allow  for 
more  commodities,  characteristics,  and  producers,  the  notation  would  be 
more  cumbersome,  but  the  analysis  and  the  results  would  basically  remain 
intact. 
Allowing  for  non-identical  consumers  is  more  involved  since  it  raises  the 
problem  that  different  consumers  may  be  willing  to  pay  different  prices.  By 
assuming  that  the  producer  can  distinguish  between  the  different  consumers 
and  charge  each  one  accordingly,  we  can  formulate  a  slightly  modified 
producer’s  problem.  As  in  section  2,  competitive  equilibria  would  exist  and 
the  nature  of  the  deviation  from  Pareto  optimality  will  be  determined  by 
individuals’  preferences  and  advertising  effectiveness. 
Owing  to  the  great  amount  of  literature  on  advertising  [see  Nelson  (1974)] 
and  the  various  market  structures  (not  necessarily  competitive)  several 
questions  remain  open  which  indicate  further  directions  for  research. 
First  there  is  a  need  for  analysis  of  other  advertising  models  to  study  the 
existence  and  welfare  properties  of  appropriately  defined  market  allocations. 
Of  particular  interest  would  be  the  examination  of  advertising  as  a  signal 
[Kihlstrom  and  Riordan  (1984),  Milgrom  and  Roberts  (1986)  and  Horst- 
mann  and  MacDonald  (1989)],  where  advertising  affects  consumer  beliefs  on 
quality  of  commodities.  It  would  require  a  careful  specification  of  the 
environment  and  the  information  structure.  Preliminary  findings  suggest  that 
the  distortions  would  be  similar  to  the  ones  appearing  in  this  paper. 
Second,  it  has  been  recognized  that  various  other  (non-market)  methods  of 
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would  be  of  interest  to  check  how  the  market  allocations  derived  in  our 
paper  fare  with  respect  to  these  alternative  methods. 
Finally,  in  our  model  the  production  of  the  public  good  was  carried  out  by 
the  producers  of  the  advertised  goods.  One  might  consider  a  set  of  firms  that 
produce  the  ‘public  good’  in  order  to  sell  it  to  the  producers  (for  advertising 
purposes).  In  this  case  it  would  be  interesting  to  examine  the  effect  that  the 
structure  of  the  public  good  industry  (number  of  firms,  competitive  or  non- 
competitive)  would  have  on  the  optimality  properties  of  the  resulting  market 
allocations. 
Appendix 
The  purpose  of  this  appendix  is  to  construct  a  numerical  example 
demonstrating  the  workings  of  the  economy  described  in  section  2.  We  will 
calculate  Pareto-optimal  allocations  as  well  as  market  allocations.  It  will  be 
shown  that  as  we  make  the  public  good  less  and  less  desirable  we  move  from 
underproduction  to  overproduction. 
In  Case  A,  where  the  public  good  is  relatively  desirable  (a  0.25  exponent 
on  y),  the  competitive  equilibrium  would  lead  to  underproduction  of  the 
public  good,  whereas  in  Case  B  (a  0.05  exponent  on  y)  the  public  good 
would  be  overproduced. 
Case  A.  The  two  consumers’  utility  functions  are  given  by 
So we  have: 
fi(t)  = 10.25. 
The  consumers’  initial  endowments  are  xF1 =O,  x$  = 4,  k:  =  10,  t* = 20  and 
each  consumer  owns  half  the  shares  of  the  firm.  The  production  functions  are 
given  by 
&,,)  = k:;5;  h(k,)  = 1 + k,. 
In  the  symmetric  Pareto-optimal  allocation  the  utility  level  for  both 
individuals  is  10.2196  and 
kxl  = 6.5700;  k, = 13.4300, 
ti = 7.0160;  xi1 =  1.2816;  xi2 = 4,  i=  1,2. 
Calculating  the  competitive  equilibrium.  We  set  the  price  of  x2  at  1. In  order 
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equations  (since  the  consumers  are  identical,  we  look  for  a  symmetric 
equilibrium): 
2(1 +ky)OJst;0.7S  +t;0.s75X~;S-4(20-tl)-0.5  =O, 
t0.25X 
1  12  =x,,p:, 
p,x,l+x12=10w+4+0.5(plk,o~-w(k,l+k,)), 
(p,l(l  +k,))k,Oi5  =4w, 
pl  k,-,0.’  = 2w, 
2x1,=8, 
k,,  + k, = 20. 
The  solution  of  these  equations  yields: 
k,,  =  14.0000;  k, = 6.0000;  t,  = 6.3614, 
xl1  =  1.8708;  x 12  = 4.0000, 
p1  =  1.8427  and  w =0.2462. 
Using  these  values  we  can  recover  u  and  q1  by  using 
u=t,/(l+k,)  and  ql=Pll((~(l+k,))0~25) 
which  yield  a=O.9088  and  q1  =  1.1603.  Finally,  the  producer’s  profit  in 
equilibrium  is  given  by 
profit  =pl  k,0;5 -  w(k,,  + kJ  =  1.9699. 
The  competitive  equilibrium  is  not  Pareto  optimal.  Looking  for  a  Pareto- 
optimal  allocation  where  individual  two’s  utility  is  10.0000  we  find  that 
k,,  =6.5816;  k,=  13.4184, 
t 1  = 7.0909;  t,  = 6.9345;  x1 1  =  1.4432, 
xl2  =4.4893;  x21 =  1.1223;  x22 = 3.5107, 
and 
ul  =  10.4262. 
Therefore,  the  first  individual  can  be  made  better  off  by  having  more  y 
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Case  B.  Let  the  two  consumers’  utility  functions  be given  by 
Ui=(tiy)O.OS  +(20-  tJO.5 +(t~.z5Xi1)0.5 +xyi5,  i=  1,2. 
Except  for  this  change  in  preferences,  the  economy  would  be  identical  to  the 
economy  in Case  A. 
The  symmetric  Pareto-optimal  allocation  would  yield  the  utility  level 
8.9264 for  both  individuals: 
k,,  = 18.5071;  k,  =  1.4929 
and 
ti=2.1648;  Xii =2.1500;  xi2 = 4.0000,  i = 1,2. 
The  competitive  equilibrium  would  yield 
k,,  = 14.0000;  k, = 6.0000, 
ti = 2.0698;  xi1 = 1.8708;  Xiz  =  4.0000,  i=  1,2, 
PI = 1.6014;  w=O.2140;  qr=  1.3351;  cr=O.2957, 
and 
profit=  1.7120. 
At  this  allocation  individual  two’s  utility  would  be  given  by  8.8754. 
Calculating  a  Pareto-optimal  allocation  where  individual  two’s  utility  is 
8.8754 we get 
k,,  = 17.6014;  k, = 2.3986, 
t, =2.1565;  t2 = 2.1265;  xI1 =2.1332, 
xIz =4.0607;  xzl  =2.0622;  x22 = 3.9393 
and 
u1 = 8.9327. 
In  this  case  the  first  individual  can  be made  better  off by producing  less y. 
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